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The Newclear Family: The Broadening 
Recognition of Non-Traditional Families 
and Where to Draw the Line 
Ally Nicol† 
Introduction 
In the past fifty years, American politics and public opinion 
have shifted regarding parentage and what constitutes a family.  In 
the wake of cases such as Holtzman v. Knott,1 Johnson v. Calvert,2 
K.M. v. E.G.,3 Obergefell v. Hodges,4 and In re M.C.,5 the rights of 
same-sex and other “non-traditional” parents have been clarified 
and expanded.  Biology and marriage have long been the most 
commonly used means of establishing parental rights, and now 
those recognitions, particularly in the wake of Obergefell, are widely 
available to most couples.6  While this recognition has been long-
awaited in the LGBT community, issues remain regarding legal 
parent status based solely on biology and the legal status of non-
traditional families.  As the law expands to recognize a more diverse 
spectrum of parents, new issues will arise regarding when parental 
status should not be granted, as opposed to how parental rights 
should be expanded. 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2018; B.A., University 
of Wisconsin, 2012.  Ally would like to thank the Staffers and Editors of Law & 
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their efforts in preparing this Note 
for publication.  Ally would also like to thank Professor June Carbone for 
contributing her expertise on this topic.  Finally, Ally would like to thank her 
partner, Tessa, for being an invaluable sounding board and for making her life an 
endless adventure. 
 1. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
 2. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 3. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (Cal. App. 2d 2011), superseded by statute 2013 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 564 (S.B. 274) (West).  “Most children have two parents, but in rare 
cases, children have more than two people who are that child’s parent in every 
way . . . .  The purpose of this bill is to abrogate In re M.C. . . . insofar as it held that 
where there are more than two people who have a claim to parentage under the 
Uniform Parentage Act, courts are prohibited from recognizing more than two of 
these people as the parents of a child, regardless of the circumstances.”  Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 564 § 1(b) (italics added). 
 6. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185, 1190–91 (2016) (discussing generally the impact of marriage equality and 
families formed through assisted reproductive technologies). 
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Holtzman v. Knott was the first decision in the United States 
in which a court recognized a lesbian as a “de facto parent” of a child 
conceived and delivered by her partner during the course of their 
relationship.7  Johnson v. Calvert involved a husband and wife who 
implanted their fertilized egg into a surrogate, who then claimed to 
be the mother after the child was born.8  The court established an 
“intent test” in California, which determines legal parent status by 
looking to the parties’ intent if a court holds that the Uniform 
Parentage Act (UPA) does not apply.9  In K.M. v. E.G., before 
separating, two women conceived twins together, with one 
intending to be only an egg donor with no parental rights and the 
other intending to be the legal mother via in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).10  When the biological mother claimed parentage over the 
birth mother after their relationship dissolved, the court found that 
both were legal parents, as evidenced by their co-maternal ties in 
addition to their marriage-like relationship.11  The court essentially 
created a new rule in California, looking beyond the UPA and the 
Johnson intent test to hold both parties as functional legal parents, 
regardless of their intentions. 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that 
same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marriage.12  
However, this decision also introduced new questions regarding the 
recognition of both biological and non-biological parents in both 
marital and non-marital families.13  In re M.C. featured three 
individuals with parental claims:  a biological mother, her same-sex 
spouse, and the biological father, with whom the biological mother 
had a sexual relationship beyond that of a sperm donor.14  The case 
itself failed to establish that three individuals could be deemed legal 
parents to a child under the UPA.15  However, it led to the California 
legislature passing a multiple-parent bill, which allows a court to 
 
 7. William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v. 
Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 
135, 135 (2013). 
 8. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). 
 9. Id. at 782. 
 10. 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005). 
 11. Id. at 679 (“K.M. did not intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather 
provided her ova to her lesbian partner with whom she was living so that E.G. could 
give birth to a child that would be raised in their joint home.”). 
 12. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015). 
 13. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa 
2013) (analyzing whether the non-birthing spouse in a lesbian marriage must be 
listed on a child’s birth certificate). 
 14. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197, 202–03 (Cal. App. 2d 2011). 
 15. Id. at 214. 
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find more than two legal parents if not doing so would be 
detrimental to the child.16 
These cases illustrate a shift toward a broader recognition of 
parentage, one that moves beyond biology as the primary 
determinant of parentage, by recognizing parental rights outside of 
marriage.  Marriage equality arguably facilitates the development 
of non-traditional parentage concepts across family law and serves 
as a platform on which to justify further expansion of the traditional 
parentage model both in and outside marriage.17  By challenging 
norms once considered fundamental to parenthood and by 
encouraging a model of parenthood that derives parentage from 
intent and conduct rather than biology and marriage, all families 
have the opportunity to obtain legal recognition. 
This Note argues that the recognition of same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell will continue to broaden the recognition of other non-
traditional family structures and, more specifically, non-biological 
parents and multi-parent families.  Same-sex marriage supports a 
parentage structure that reduces the importance of biology and 
gender and instead focuses on the intent and conduct of those 
holding themselves out as a family.  The logical next step is to 
expand this understanding of parentage to include, by default, 
parents who have no biological tie to the child, single or multiple 
biological parents,18 and to recognize all families, both in and 
outside of marriage.  This Note also argues that in the wake of this 
progress, it will become increasingly important to establish where 
the line is regarding the recognition of legal parents.  While a shift 
toward a functional or intent-based model of parentage is a smart 
step for the courts to take, there remain issues in the framework as 
it exists and where it is headed, specifically in situations when the 
court should not grant parental rights to someone who might 
traditionally have a legally recognized parental relationship to a 
child, such as through biology or marriage. 
This Note utilizes case law to illustrate the chronological 
journey toward our present day and what potentially lies ahead in 
the realm of non-traditional family law.  Part I provides a brief 
 
 16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2017) (“In an appropriate action, a court may 
find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are 
parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to 
the child.”). 
 17. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1190. 
 18. See Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent In Vitro Fertilization: Gene 
Replacement for the Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial Diseases, 101 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 31, 32–34 (2014) (explaining mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) 
in depth). 
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background of the political and social climate leading to where we 
are today regarding non-traditional family rights and highlights 
how the notion of the traditional family structure shifted 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, leading to new legal rights 
established in the 1990s for non-biological parents in same-sex 
relationships.  Part II discusses the legal status of same-sex families 
prior to marriage equality and the various ways in which same-sex 
parents achieved legal status.  Part III outlines the post-Obergefell 
changes in family law, specifically regarding the recognition of 
functional and intentional parentage and ponders what lies ahead 
for non-traditional families in the wake of advancement in 
reproductive technologies.  Part IV attempts to draw a line using a 
conduct-based standard regarding situations when a court should 
not award legal parental rights to an individual who might 
otherwise have a legal claim, biological or otherwise, to a child. 
I. Background 
The growth of parent-child relationships outside of marriage 
was primarily a response to changes in American family life.19  With 
the introduction of no-fault divorce in the late 1960s and its 
widespread application by the late 1980s, divorce was more widely 
available and easier to obtain.20  As divorced parents and single 
mothers formed new families, stepparents filled in and assumed 
parental roles.21  Stepparent adoption was a mechanism for 
recognizing non-biological parents by providing parental rights to 
the stepparent.22  Prior to marriage equality, same-sex couples had 
no similar mechanism for recognizing non-biological or third party 
parents.23  Beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s,24 same-sex couples 
could pursue second-parent adoptions, which essentially adapted 
the stepparent adoption model and allowed a same-sex partner to 
adopt their partner’s biological or adoptive child without 
terminating the first parent’s legal parental status.25 
 
 19. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1195–1196. 
 20. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce 
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1987) (stating that in 1969, California 
adopted the first no-fault divorce law in the United States and that by 1987, no-fault 
divorce was available in all 50 states). 
 21. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their 
Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 82 (2006). 
 22. Id. at 107. 
 23. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1201. 
 24. Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 17, 28 (2013). 
 25. Id. at 28–29. 
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In 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in Holtzman v. 
Knott that a lesbian partner could be granted de facto parenthood 
when the following factors were present: 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and 
fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a 
parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner 
and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the 
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and 
development, including contributing towards the child’s 
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) 
that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of 
time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature.26 
If de facto parenthood is established, then the appropriate 
standard for determining visitation would be what is in the “best 
interest of the child,” regardless of biological ties or the gender of 
the person seeking recognition.27  Holtzman was the first decision 
to recognize a lesbian as a de facto parent.28  The issue of a non-
biological parent’s ability to be recognized as a parent was becoming 
increasingly important at the time of Holtzman, as the number of 
same-sex couples having children was on the rise.29  The Holtzman 
four-factor test is a balanced and reliable method for determining 
when standing should be granted to a non-legally recognized parent 
suing the legally recognized parent for visitation with a child.30  The 
dissent in Holtzman stated a concern commonly heard in the fight 
for marriage equality—that by recognizing same-sex parents, legal 
parents could then be sued by any third party who might choose to 
assert parental rights to the child.31 
In Johnson v. Calvert, a married couple used the husband’s 
sperm to fertilize the wife’s egg via IVF and then implanted the 
fertilized egg in a surrogate.32  After the child was born, both the 
 
 26. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 
1995); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (“[T]he legal parent must 
consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the third 
party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform parental 
functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a parent-child 
bond must be forged.”). 
 27. Holtzman, 553 N.W.2d at 421. 
 28. See Turner, supra note 7. 
 29. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1197. 
 30. Beth Neu, Wisconsin Brings Child Visitation out of the Closet by Granting 
Standing to Nonparents in Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis.), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 475 (1995), 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 915 (1996). 
 31. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 441–42 (Day, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 32. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). 
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wife and surrogate claimed to be the child’s mother.33  The court 
held that both women potentially had valid claims to being the 
natural mother.34  However, looking at the parties’ intentions, the 
court found that the wife was the child’s natural mother because 
she intended to be the mother at the time of conception via IVF and 
implantation.35  The court denied the surrogate mother legal 
parental status despite her potential claim as mother under the 
UPA, which provides parental status for birth mothers.36  The 
intent test from Johnson was meant to determine parental status 
when the UPA does not apply.37  As seen in Johnson, intent can be 
the dominant factor in determining parental status over traditional 
understandings of parentage, such as being the “natural mother.”38 
The K.M. v. E.G. case introduced a new issue regarding lesbian 
parentage:  co-maternity.  In this case, the biological mother, K.M., 
sought recognition as the legal parent over the birth mother, E.G., 
who was impregnated via IVF using K.M.’s ova fertilized with 
sperm from an anonymous donor.39  After their relationship ended, 
E.G. argued that she intended to be the sole parent of the children 
while K.M. claimed that the two women had been raising the 
children together since birth.40  K.M.’s attorney argued that “[i]f 
these same facts arose between a husband and wife during a divorce 
proceeding in which both parties were the genetic and gestational 
parents of these children, there would not be any valid dispute over 
parentage.”41  The court ultimately recognized both K.M. and E.G. 
as legal parents, going against the intent test promulgated in 
Johnson.  The court essentially chose to acknowledge the parties’ 
status as functional parents over their clear intent to have only one 
of them recognized as the legal parent. 
With marriage-like relationships such as those in Holtzman 
and K.M. now deemed sufficient to indicate parental function and 
intent, the next logical step is recognition of additional non-married 
and non-biological parents. 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 781. 
 35. Id. at 782. 
 36. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 3(1) (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1973) (“The parent 
and child relationship between a child and (1) the natural mother may be established 
by proof of her having given birth to the child . . . .”). 
 37. 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
 38. Id. 
 39. 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11, K.M. v. E.G. (Ca. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 
A101754), 2003 WL 23893651. 
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II. Recognition of Same-Sex Families Prior to Obergefell 
As previously mentioned, parental recognitions started 
shifting away from being defined solely by biology and marriage in 
the late 1960s, as illustrated by the growing legal recognition of 
both unmarried biological fathers and married non-biological 
stepparents.  These developments were not only beneficial to 
heterosexual couples but to same-sex couples as well, in that biology 
was no longer viewed as a fundamental aspect of parenthood.  In 
the early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the 
constitutional parental rights of an unmarried father in Stanley v. 
Illinois.42  The Court held that 
as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a 
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken 
from him and that, by denying him a hearing . . . the State 
denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.43 
The Court further stated that children who are “unlegitimized by a 
marriage ceremony . . . cannot be denied the right of other children 
because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, 
and important as those arising within a more formally organized 
family unit.”44 
The Court established in the 1970s and 1980s that biology 
might be only part of the parentage equation, with parental conduct 
being the other necessary aspect of parenthood required of 
unmarried biological fathers.45  The Court explained in Lehr v. 
Robinson that “[t]he significance of the biological connection is that 
it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male 
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring,”46 but that a 
father must “accept[] some measure of responsibility for the child’s 
future”47 in order to be viewed as a parent.  Also in the 1970s, the 
Uniform Law Commission established the UPA, which included 
what is now commonly known as the “holding out” presumption, 
requiring a father to “receive[] the child into his home and openly 
hold[] out the child as his natural child” in order to be granted full 
parental rights.48  In including this conduct-based language, the 
UPA solidified the shift towards recognizing parental status as 
 
 42. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 651–52. 
 45. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 46. Id. at 262. 
 47. Id. 
 48. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1973). 
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being more than biological.  Finally, non-biological parents within 
married heterosexual couples began to gain broader recognition 
within the law.  These non-traditional families included those with 
stepparents and those created using alternate forms of fertilization, 
including assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF and sperm 
donation.49  These developments illustrate how, in some cases, a 
biological connection to a child is only one factor considered in 
establishing parental rights. 
Advocates for same-sex marriage and family equality used 
these new parental recognitions of unmarried, biological fathers 
and married, non-biological parents to show that a new model of 
parenthood was emerging that could recognize the non-marital, 
non-biological parent-child relationships such as those of a same-
sex couple using IVF or sperm donation.50  In summary, in the years 
leading up to the decision in Obergefell, the definition of legal 
parentage moved away from being defined by biology, gender, 
sexual orientation, and marriage, to instead being defined more by 
the intent and conduct of the parties raising a child as a family. 
III. The Post-Obergefell Landscape 
A. Recognizing Functional and Intentional Parentage 
As outlined in Section II, proponents of same-sex marriage 
prior to Obergefell argued that same-sex couples are as capable as 
different-sex couples with regard to parenting, and that the 
similarities are not related to biology or gender, but instead are 
related to the functional and intentional relationships displayed 
within both groups.  Opponents of marriage equality instead relied 
on conservative, child-centered arguments to justify same-sex 
marriage bans,51 insisting that the ideal form of parenting includes 
a married mother and father, which sets same-sex couples outside 
 
 49. Id. at § 5(a) (“If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the 
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a 
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father 
of a child thereby conceived.”). 
 50. Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 717, 731 (2016) (arguing that same-sex relationships are capable of showing 
the same type of family commitment and function as that of a married heterosexual 
couple and that second-parent adoption was used as an equitable remedy for same-
sex couples denied equality). 
 51. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of 
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 248 (2006) (describing 
how children benefit from exposure to a “‘model family,’ in which the husband is the 
father and his wife is the mother”). 
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of this ideal.52  In order to counter the opposition’s view that 
marriage and heterosexual procreation go hand in hand, those 
fighting for marriage equality turned to cases on unmarried fathers 
and stepparents in order to establish conduct and intent, not 
biology, as the key to parentage.  In establishing marriage equality, 
the Obergefell Court also established that a functional and 
intentional model of parenthood included not only same-sex 
families, but could also include other non-traditional families that 
exist outside of marriage. 
The marital presumption is a traditional notion that any child 
born to a married woman is presumed to be the biological and legal 
child of the husband, regardless of whether he is actually the 
biological father.  With same-sex couples, there are very limited 
scenarios that would result in both partners having a biological 
connection to the child, meaning that non-biological parents would 
almost exclusively rely on the marital presumption or adoption to 
attain parental status alongside their partner as a biological parent.  
As mentioned earlier, the “holding out” concept could apply to an 
unmarried non-biological partner in a same-sex marriage to 
determine whether that person had the appropriate parent-like 
relationship with the child to be deemed a legal parent. 
In the wake of Obergefell, courts are faced with determining 
how to rework the marital presumption to address certain issues 
regarding same-sex families, such as who is allowed to be listed on 
a birth certificate.  The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the 
state is not constitutionally required to grant lesbian couples a birth 
certificate that lists both female partners as mothers to a child 
conceived through donor insemination.53  The court stated that the 
Arkansas statute in question regarding birth certificates “centers 
on the relationship of the biological mother and the biological father 
to the child, not on the marital relationship of husband and wife,” 
and therefore, the statute does not go against the ruling in 
Obergefell.54  Some states continue to define the marital 
 
 52. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating that families with married mothers and fathers “provide the 
stability that marriage affords and the presence of both male and female authority 
figures, which it considers critical to optimal childhood development and 
socialization”). 
 53. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Ark. 2016) (“[W]e cannot say that 
naming the nonbiological spouse on the birth certificate of the child is an interest of 
the person so fundamental that the State must accord the interest its respect under 
either statute.”).  The Supreme Court granted petition for writ of certiorari and 
reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings 
in light of Obergefell.  Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 54. Smith, 505 S.W.3d at 178. 
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presumption for same-sex couples by biology, even though the same 
is not always true for opposite-sex couples.55 
Recent case law is still somewhat split between recognizing 
equal rights for non-biological parents or instead continuing to limit 
those rights.  The Court of Appeals of New York held that “a person 
who is not a biological or adoptive parent may obtain standing to 
petition for custody or visitation,”56 which overruled an earlier New 
York decision stating that a biologically unrelated third party will 
not be considered a parent in regards to seeking custody, even if the 
party has a “close and loving relationship with the child.”57  The 
later court cited social science research that highlights the trauma 
suffered “as a result of separation from a primary attachment 
figure—such as a de facto parent—regardless of that figure’s 
biological or adoptive ties to the children.”58  This decision brought 
New York in line with most other states regarding the rights of de 
facto parents to seek visitation and custody.59 
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
in Partanen v. Gallagher that a person may establish him or herself 
as a child’s presumptive parent in the absence of a biological 
relationship with the child.60  Partanen, the non-biological and non-
birth mother, was not listed on either of her children’s birth 
certificates, nor did she ever adopt the children, but she 
participated in raising the children from the time of their birth and 
she and her partner, the biological mother, held themselves out as 
the children’s parents.61  The court reasoned that Partanen showed 
that the children were born to both her and her partner with “the 
full acknowledgment, participation, and consent” of Partanen and 
“with the shared intention that [the parties] would both be parents 
to the resulting children.”62  The ruling in this case applies broadly 
to any non-biological parent. 
 
 55. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(a) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 700.2114(1)(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 891.41 (2017) (using the word “natural” to 
define the presumption of paternity). 
 56. In re Brook S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1, 28 (N.Y. 2016). 
 57. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 655 (N.Y. 1991). 
 58. Brooke S.B., 28 N.Y.3d at 25. 
 59. See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 19 (Me. 2014) (holding that the court 
may award visitation to a “person with significant bonds to the child” who has had 
more than a “limited relationship to the child”); Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d 79, 83–
84 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that custody shall be determined “in accordance with 
the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent 
and to any de facto custodian”) (internal citations omitted). 
 60. 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Mass. 2016). 
 61. Id. at 1136. 
 62. Id. at 1142. 
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The intent and conduct of parties has become increasingly 
relevant in custody and visitation disputes as states move away 
from biology and marriage as the primary determinants of 
parentage.  Two recent Indiana cases deal with this notion.  In 
Gardenour v. Bondelie, the court held that the non-biological 
mother in a lesbian partnership was the child’s legal parent under 
Indiana law.63  She was awarded joint legal custody, visitation, and 
was ordered to pay child support.64  The court relied on two cases 
dealing with heterosexual couples using a sperm donor in which the 
court established that because both parties knowingly and 
voluntarily consented to the artificial insemination, the non-
biological father was a legal parent and was required to pay child 
support after the couple separated.65  The second case, Sheetz v. 
Sheetz, involves a married couple who held out the child of an affair 
as their own for 12 years, even though the child was conceived while 
the husband was in prison.66  The Indiana Court of Appeals ordered 
the husband, a non-biological father, to pay child support, stating 
that any other ruling would essentially leave the minor “without a 
father.”67  The court relied in all of these cases on the non-biological 
parent holding out the child as their own, regardless of the lack of 
a biological connection.  In both cases, the court looked to the 
parties’ intent and conduct to determine whether the non-biological 
parent had parental rights. 
Not all courts find in favor of parental rights for the non-
biological parent.  The Michigan Court of Appeals issued an opinion 
denying legal standing to a non-biological lesbian partner who had 
co-parented the child in question since birth.68  The biological 
mother denied all contact with their son after their relationship 
ended.69  The court relied on Michigan Supreme Court precedent,70 
 
 63. 60 N.E.3d 1109, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 64. Id. at 1121. 
 65. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994); Engelking v. Engelking, 
982 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 66. 63 N.E.3d 1077, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 67. Id. at 1083. 
 68. Lake v. Putnam, 894 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016). 
 69. Id. at 68. 
 70. Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999) (holding that the equitable 
parent doctrine, which gives de facto parents standing to seek custody and visitation 
in court, can only be recognized in the context of a legal marriage).  The court 
majority refused to recognize a heterosexual man who co-parented his former 
girlfriend’s children as an equitable parent, making no reference to the “best interest 
of the child” standard.  Since same-sex couples could not marry in Michigan until 
2015, same-sex parents could legally be denied equitable parent protection, meaning 
that the biological parent could elect to completely remove a child from the life of the 
non-biological parent. 
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which rejected the argument that holding oneself out as a child’s 
parent alone is sufficient to be considered that child’s parent under 
the equitable parent doctrine.71 
It is arguable that the Obergefell decision exacerbates 
concerns that courts will continue to limit paths to legal parentage 
outside of marriage for any parents, since Obergefell describes 
marriage as “a keystone of our social order.”72  The Obergefell Court 
goes on further to state that 
[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage 
offers . . . children [of same-sex couples] suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser.  They also suffer 
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried 
parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more 
difficult and uncertain family life.73 
Even considering that states are still seeking to deny equal 
rights to non-biological parents, marriage equality has allowed the 
courts to recognize an ever-expanding array of non-traditional 
parents, at least for those who are married.  Questions remain 
regarding how the courts will treat parties that do not follow 
traditional gender-based constructs.  In a recent decision out 
Louisiana, the state Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the 
trial court’s decision denying a petition for custody by a non-
biological transgender male partner of the birth mother.74  It is 
interesting to ponder what the Court would have decided if the 
parties were legally married,75 since the marital presumption would 
hold the male partner in a marriage as the presumed natural 
father, regardless of whether he was the biological father. 
B. Recognizing Non-Traditional Families in the Wake of 
Recent Technological Advancements 
Marriage equality has made possible parental structures 
based on intent and function and, in turn, has arguably moved 
parentage away from being defined solely by biology, gender, sexual 
orientation, and marital status.  Marriage equality is only the 
beginning though, in terms of recognizing non-traditional families, 
as there are many scenarios that do not incorporate marriage at all.  
Section A of this Part briefly discussed some non-traditional ideas 
 
 71. Id. at 23. 
 72. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 73. Id. at 2600 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)). 
 74. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So.3d 909 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
 75. Id. at 918–19 n.9 (stating that Vincent, the male partner, testified that they 
were a same-sex couple at the time of their union, and as a result they were unable 
to obtain a marriage license at that time). 
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about parentage, specifically regarding the use of assisted 
reproductive technology and also regarding parents who do not fit 
traditional gender constructs.  As reproductive technology 
continues to develop, the reality of having a single biological parent, 
three or more biological parents, or even same-sex biological 
parents is growing near.  In response to technological advances like 
mitochondrial gene therapy, which can implant the cells of one 
female into the egg of another female, courts that elevate biological 
ties above all else will need to grapple with this new form of non-
traditional, yet biological, parenthood. 
Marriage equality has the potential to normalize certain 
alternative forms of reproduction, such as surrogacy and IVF, 
simply because of the frequency with which same-sex couples use 
these methods to start a family.  Surrogacy contracts are still 
forbidden in some states,76 so the shifting landscape caused by 
marriage equality could benefit more than just same-sex couples.  
Additionally, the functional and intentional parentage ideals that 
have flourished post-marriage-equality could potentially lead to 
broader recognition of multiple-parent families.  As mentioned 
above, In re M.C. featured three people with parentage claims:  a 
biological mother, her same-sex spouse, and the biological father 
with whom the biological mother had a sexual relationship.77  When 
the Court ruled that the UPA only allowed two parents, the 
California legislature responded with a multiple-parent bill 
allowing a court to declare more than two legal parents if not doing 
so would be detrimental to the child.78  Marriage equality is just one 
mechanism used to broaden recognition for non-traditional 
parentage regimes, but it is not required in order for states to 
recognize new forms of parentage.  States that prohibited same-sex 
marriage prior to Obergefell recognized multiple parents in some 
cases.  In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, the court recognized that three 
individuals—a biological mother, a non-biological mother, and a 
sperm donor—may have parental rights and obligations.79  Families 
with multiple parents can be formed by same-sex and different-sex 
couples, both in and out of marriage, so legal recognition is not 
limited to certain situations involving only same- or opposite-sex 
couples in or outside of marriage.  What the future will hold for non-
 
 76. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2011); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010). 
 77. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197, 202 (Cal. App. 2d 2011). 
 78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2013). 
 79. 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
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traditional parentage will be unpredictable, and it will likely 
continue to grow. 
IV. Deciding When to Withhold or Withdraw Legal Parental 
Rights in Response to the Shifting Landscape 
This Note concludes by attempting to establish the situations 
in which parental rights should not be recognized.  There are two 
general categories where it might not be appropriate for someone to 
have parental rights.  The first can be described as the caregiver-
versus-legal-parent determination.  In this category, it is sometimes 
difficult to determine when it is appropriate to recognize a 
caregiver—which is defined as a person who is not a parent, “but 
who nevertheless is allocated and exercises residential 
responsibility or custodial responsibility” for a child80—as a legal 
parent and when it might not be necessary.  The second category 
includes situations where a legal parent should have their rights 
eliminated, such as in instances where the child is the product of 
rape. 
Caregivers can exist in many forms.  The most common 
caregivers are parents.  At issue in this section are non-biological 
caregivers, such as stepparents and grandparents or extended 
family.  Caregivers are also relevant in multiple-parent situations, 
such as co-parenting families where there might be two separate 
sets of partners jointly raising a child, or in families where there 
are multiple people caring for and raising a child.  When there are 
several people vying for parental rights, even if all of the parties are 
in agreement about co-parenting together, the possibility of causing 
harm to the child increases if those relationships deteriorate, 
causing uncertainty regarding who is legally recognized as a parent 
and who is not. 
Additional issues can arise when multiple parents come in and 
out of a child’s life.  Should each successive partner attain parental 
rights simply through the marital presumption or by holding out 
the child?  Is it in the best interests of a child to have multiple 
parties exchanging parental rights over the child?  The answers to 
these questions ultimately rely on the intent of the parties.  If a 
parent intends for each successive partner to become their child’s 
legal parent, the court should recognize them as such.  What is more 
difficult is determining if there should be some limit to how many 
parents can be recognized for one child.  Since many children of 
 
 80. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02(7) (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
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divorce already have two sets of parents, a logical cap would be to 
only recognize legal status for up to four parents of a child at any 
given time, regardless of biological or familial ties.  However, there 
is no similar framework to help determine how many parents over 
time should be allowed to have parental rights.  Ideally, only those 
who come into a child’s life with the intention of remaining involved 
indefinitely should be granted parental rights. 
The second category includes those who arguably do not 
deserve to be recognized as parents, but are often still recognized as 
parents in some form under the law.  Within this category are 
rapists, parents who sexually abuse or otherwise mentally or 
physically harm their partners or children, and absent parents who 
only return later in a child’s life seeking to regain the parental 
rights that they abandoned.  Since parental rights are viewed as 
fundamental rights in the United States, these rights are not easily 
removed.81  In order to overcome biology and remove someone’s 
parental rights, there must be “grave and weighty reasons” for such 
a removal.82 
In S.J. v. L.T., the court held that a biological father’s parental 
rights would not be terminated even though he was convicted of 
sexually assaulting the mother and there was ample evidence that 
the child was conceived because of that sexual assault.83  
Additionally, the issue of abuse frequently involves the distinction 
between physical custody and visitation.  If a parent does not have 
physical custody, courts are hesitant to deny them visitation rights.  
In Arnold v. Naughton, the court held that a noncustodial father 
who sexually abused his child could still have supervised visitation 
rights.84  In Bobbitt v. Eizenga, the trial court held that a man had 
no rights to custody or visitation due to a North Carolina statute 
that denied custody and visitation rights to persons convicted of 
“first and second degree rape” that resulted in the birth of a child.85 
The state Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this case 
concerned a man convicted of “attempted statutory rape,” the 
statute did not apply.86  The court went further to hold that without 
specific legislation regarding “attempted statutory rape,” the court 
 
 81. Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
275, 276 (2012). 
 82. S.J. v. L.T., 727 P.2d 789, 795–97 (Alaska 1986). 
 83. Id. at 791. 
 84. 486 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
 85. 715 S.E.2d 613, 614 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 86. Id. at 616. 
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would not deny visitation to a man convicted of such a crime which 
resulted in the birth of a child.87 
Since courts are clearly not a reliable source for protecting the 
victims of rape from having to share parental rights with their 
rapists, legislation is necessary to address this issue.  Without 
legislation in place to withhold parental rights in these situations, 
rapists have the same rights as any other biological parent.88  While 
some states have enacted statues that limit the rights of rapists—
and many first require a conviction—some rely heavily on judicial 
discretion and most inadequately protect victims from subsequent 
trauma.89  Enacting nationwide legislation terminating a rapist’s 
parental rights would demonstrate not only that our society sees 
rape as an atrocious crime, but also that victims deserve the 
protection of the law. 
The argument for limiting parental rights in these scenarios 
stems from the best interests of the child, while also taking account 
of parental conduct.  Children who are born because of rape are not 
served by allowing the rapist to have a parental claim to them.  
Similarly, parents who neglect, abuse, or otherwise harm their 
children should not be allowed to retain their parental rights but 
instead should have those rights removed to protect the safety and 
health of the child.  A person’s harmful and abusive conduct should 
be grounds for having all parental rights terminated. 
There is no clear line between when legal status should be 
given to an individual and when it should be taken away, but this 
Note suggests that there are at least two categories that outline 
situations in which parental recognition should be limited to a 
certain number of recognized parents and when recognition simply 
is not appropriate.  As the law expands and societal understandings 
of families and parenthood continue to develop, courts will have to 
grapple with what is right, what is in the best interests of a child, 
and what is the law.  Above all, parental conduct should be the 
deciding factor in cases that come close to this line. 
Conclusion 
With the expansion of parentage laws in the 1960s and 1970s 
to recognize unmarried, biological fathers and non-biological 
stepparents, and now with the establishment of marriage equality, 
both married and unmarried couples, of both same- and opposite-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Bitar, supra note 81, at 285. 
 89. Id. at 291–93. 
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sex, we are seeing a shift toward a broader understanding of what 
it means to be a parent.  Marriage equality challenged the 
traditions of biology that once defined parenthood and in turn 
helped broaden the understanding of parentage to include things 
like parental conduct and intent.  This shifting understanding of 
what defines a family and what makes a person a parent will 
continue to evolve as new technology further challenges our 
understanding of reproduction and as new forms of family challenge 
our ideas about what is in the best interest of a child.  The continual 
evolution of parentage will force courts to make increasingly 
judgment-based determinations as to what constitutes a legal 
parent and what does not and what truly is in the best interests of 
a child.  While there is no clear line between who should and who 
should not have parental rights, it is critical for all states to 
establish legislation regarding scenarios where parental rights 
should not be given by default, such as when children are born as a 
result of rape.  Ultimately, parental conduct should be considered 
over intent, marriage, or even biology, when deciding who should 
have parental rights. 
 
